nobles 3.nob.002002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Many Jewish commentaries and translations describe the Nephilim as “sons of nobles” rather than “sons of God” or “sons of angels”.^[14] This is also the rendering suggested in the Targum Onkelos.

Likewise, a long-held view among some Christians is that the sons of God were not the Nephilim spoken of in the text, but the formerly righteous descendants http://louisyjysheehan.blogspot.com of Seth who rebelled, while the daughters of men were the unrighteous descendants of Cain, Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire  and the Nephilim the offspring of their union.^[15] This view dates to at least the 3rd century AD, with references in Sextus Julius Africanus,^[16] as well as throughout the Clementine literature.^[17] Holders of this view^[18] have

Akiyama 4.aki.0003003 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

No. 469

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     December 7, 1941

TO: Net                                                                                                Circular # 2493.

In 2 parts complete.

Secret.

Separate Message.

Policies:

In regard to our handling of enemy subjects and enemy property in Japan, we will approach this matter in the magnanimity of a great nation, complying with international law as far as possible, and exercising care not to give the enemy nations or other third party nations any occasion for taking retaliatory measures, or for making unfavorable propaganda.

Main points:

(1) Diplomatic officials of enemy countries:

(a) Evacuation. The evacuation of enemy diplomatic officials will be carried out on the basis of exchanges for our diplomatic and consular officials resident in enemy countries.

(b) Handling of the above until their evacuation. The inviolable rights pertaining to diplo­matic officials of enemy countries, whose duties come to an end simultaneously with the beginning of war, will be respected as a general rule. However, telephones will be cut off, and the use of wave radios and wireless transmitters will be seized. Members of the staffs of em­bassies and legations, for the present, as a general rule will be allowed to live in the embassy or legation compounds, and no inconvenience will be caused in the matter of daily living.

(2) Consular officials.

(a) Evacuation. As far as possible consular officials will be handled under the same heading with diplomatic officials.

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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

(b) The handling of the same until the time of their evacuation: The offices will be closed and sealed. Short wave radio and wireless equipment Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire will be seized. Members of consulate staffs for the time being will be allowed to live at their present places of abode and as far as conditions warrant may use their official residences, with no restrictions upon their daily living.

(3) Enemy subjects residing in Japan: In addition to such police surveillance and protec­tion as is necessary, individuals regarding whom there is ample ground for suspicion will be rounded up; and all military men, seamen, or aviation personnel as well as those qualified for these services, persons of special technical skill, persons suspected of being foreign spies, and all males between 18 and 45 will for the present be placed under arrest. However, in view of the fact that we have a very large number of subjects residing in enemy territory, we will exercise caution so that there may be nothing of the nature of ill‑treatment occasioned for them.

(4) Publicly owned enemy property: Such public property, aside from embassy, legation and consular buildings, which can be used either directly or indirectly for military purposes will, if necessary, be confiscated.

(5) Privately owned enemy property: Privately owned property will not be seized or confis­cated except in the event of general requisitioning.

(6) While no special restrictions will be placed upon the diplomatic http://Louis1J1Sheehan.us and consular officials of neutral countries resident in Japan, those of quasi enemy countries (such as Panama, Iran, Norway, Belgium, Egypt, Greece, etc.) will be denied the use of codes.

The evacuation of the enemy diplomatic and consular officials who are in Manchukuo and China will be handled in the same manner as the above.http://Louis1J1Sheehan.us

Trans.  12‑9‑41

No. 470

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                        November 25, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 793.

Re my # 705[a].

JIPPU is extremely concerned over the matter of the fine. Please make the arrangements I requested in my caption message immediately. If this is impossible I am wondering if there would be any objections to my making arrangements to remit the money from here. Please wire instructions immediately.

---

[a] See IV, 530.

Trans.  12‑4‑41

No. 471

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                        November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           No number.

I know that you are doing your best to take care of my personnel problems, but Japanese-American relations are now so delicate that work in this office is becoming and will become heavier and heavier. We have to keep in contact with inner Government circles here in order to get military and other information. Moreover, we need competent personnel to handle our propaganda and machinations. As you can well guess, the prospect is that hereafter my troubles in this report will keep increasing. Furthermore, this situation was certainly rendered no better by the return to Japan of KIHARA and the change in posts of MORI. Doubtless you Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

A-227

thought it best to make these changes, but if things are left as they now are, no matter how hard I try, it will be impossible to carry out the duties incumbent upon me. Will you, therefore, please consider the following recommendations:

(1) You told me that KIHARA might stay in Japan for quite a long while. However, I must get in touch with the inner circles of the Philippine Government without loss of a day. We cannot be lax in this respect, so I want you to please have him return to his post just as soon as possible.

(2) In order that I may make contact without any trouble, if and when necessary, for the time being I will let MORI take office in Davao immediately, but, after all, matters concerning Davao have to be discussed directly with the Government officials here in Manila and from the very nature of the place, an aged man could handle the situation quite satisfactorily, so please appoint a consul for Davao and let me have MORI brought back here just as soon as practicable.

(3) Not long ago I informed you by letter how anxious I was to get to work on our basic in­vestigation plans. You know, this is an excellent training ground for our aides and I would like for you to send me an aide who has been educated in the United States.

As soon as there is a ship, I will send KAWAMINAMI to his post. I think it will be about December 8th. Considering his family matters, I do not think it feasible to postpone his sailing any longer than that. Then, too, even though he stayed, it would be no substitute for my recom­mendations (1), (2), and (3) above.

Trans.  12‑5‑41

No. 472

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 27, 1941

TO: Manila                                                                                          # 379.

The Osaka Steamship Company had on deposit the sum of 125,000 pesos in the Manila branch of the Specie Bank and the Bank of Taiwan, representing freight collections. From this they have paid the operating expenses of their branch office there and have about 83,000 pesos on hand which they wish to transmit to Japan. They have contacted the authorities there but as there are no prospects of an immediate settlement they have requested your assistance in this matter.

A. Are there any prospects of your being able to negotiate a permit for remitting this money

B. If this is impossible there would be no objections to your borrowing this money as a secret fund to use there and then we would reimburse the company here in Japan. Is this feasible? Please wire immediately.http://Louis1J1Sheehan.us

Trans.  12‑6‑41

No. 473

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                        November 28, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 802.

(Request Message.)

From NAGAWO, resident manager of the Osaka Steamship branch, to the Chief of the Finance Section in the home office.

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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

In regard to the matter of remittance, we see no prospect of making purchases without a favorable change in the situation. Because of Sensasu [a] I will write you the details from the branch office.

---

[a] Kana spelling; probably means censors.

Trans. 12‑5‑41

No. 474

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                        November 28, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 803.

Re your # 379[a].

(To be handled in Government code.)

1. The matter mentioned in my # 772[b] has also to be considered. Though I am negotiating anew, I have no hopes that ‑‑‑‑‑ permits can be secured. I see no recourse but to watch the development of the situation a little longer and then when a favorable opportunity arises, to make fresh representations to them.

2. In regard to withdrawals of deposits, permits are required but in view of the fact that these deposits are in the name of the local Osaka Shōsen branch office, it is virtually impossible to secretly make a transfer of these funds to this office.

---

[a] See IV, 472.

[b] Not available.

Trans.  12‑6‑41

No. 475

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                        November 29, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 806.

(Abstract) Nihro states that they have decided to destroy excess code books and that they were burned on the 29th.

Trans.  12‑15‑41

No. 476

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                        November 30, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 809.

Due to the straining of international relations, we have destroyed in readiness for emergency, out of the codes kept at this office the Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire ‑‑‑‑‑ (it was, of course, reported in my #806[a] (  )) on the 29th.

As a result we find it impossible to decipher your message of the 29th (Yokohama Special Bank request telegram ‑‑‑‑‑ number of words 18. )

Will you please wire the same in the Foreign Office code.

---

[a] See IV, 475.

Trans.  12‑7‑41

A-229

No. 477

FROM: Panama (Akiyama)                                                                  October 18, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 219.

Re my message # 212[b].

(Part 1 of 3)[a].

1. Yesterday, the 17th, the entire diplomatic corps, including myself, acknowledged in writing the new government’s assumption of power (the United States alone made a state­ment of acceptance without a moment’s delay. The Italian Minister was the only one who hesitated for awhile, and even then he merely said that due notice had been taken of the mat­ter. According to what the Colombian Minister, who filed a statement, told me confidentially, his country made an issue of the fact that GUARDIA was made president because the Presi­dent designate No. 3 was Minister to Peru but was out of town. Colombia, however, made her statement of acceptance on the 17th.

2. According to the explanations of the Mexican Minister, who also filed a statement, a presidential discharge should be handled by the judiciary as a whole. A mere statement by the Supreme Court is sufficient. Therefore, there is not much wonder that the embassies of the various American countries should feel dissatisfaction with the whole thing.

---

[a] For Part 2 of 3, see IV, 478.

[b] Not available.

Translator’s Note: This message being very badly garbled, the translation has been made more on the basis of context.

Trans.  10‑27‑41

No. 478

FROM: Panama (Akiyama)                                                                  October 18, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 219.

(Part 2 of 3.)

3. Furthermore, the two ministers said in regard to defense of American rights that all Central and South American countries are acting strictly voluntarily in taking definite steps against the Axis, that they are not blindly following the United States.

4. The local government declares that the “veiled intervention” by the United States, mentioned in your wire # 86[a] of the 11th, is not prevalent although any child knows that the events are based on a private agreement with the United States.

The Colombian minister told me privately that since America’s Good Neighbor Policy was ineffective, the only course left open to her was stricter policing of Central and South America, and that new developments in the situation will make still more severe this type of pressure on Central and South America by the United States.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans.  10‑24‑41

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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 479

FROM: Panama (Akiyama)                                                                  October 18, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 219.

(Part 3 of 3.)

5. Furthermore, this administration, having assumed office, will cooperate fully with the United States in regard to the various questions having to do with relationships between Pan­amanian territory and the Canal Zone, the registration of merchant vessels, air bases, and the granting of additional advance bases. The government having decided to carry out this pro­gram, the Minister to Mexico City was appointed as the Ambassador to Washington on the 15th, and on the 16th the Minister to Germany, who had been rumored as being pro‑Axis and had been recalled, was put on the inactive list.

Honolulu class 0.hon.00002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

No. 279

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          November 15, 1941

TO: Honolulu (Riyoji)                                                                         # 111.

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical,Louis J. Sheehan, Esquiremake your “ships in harbor report” irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

Trans.  12-3-41

No. 280

FROM: Honolulu (Kita)                                                                       November 18, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 222.

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my # 219[a] on that day.

Area A[b]—A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.

Area C[c]—3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.

2. On the 17th, the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks “KS”. 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in area D[d].

3. At 10:00 a.m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.

Relayed to —–.

---

[a] Not deciphered. Dated 14 November 1941.

[b] Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

[c] East Loch.

[d] Middle Loch.

Trans.  12-6-41

A-147

No. 281

FROM: Honolulu (Kita)                                                                       November 18, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 224.

An advance party of 46 American transport experts and engineers, headed by Captain RICHARD M. JONES arrive in port on the 16th to operate trucks on the Burma Road. It is said that there are now in use on the Burma Road 3,500 new type trucks, mostly of 21/2 ton capacity.

Trans.  12-5-41

No. 282

FROM: Tokyo(Togo)                                                                           November 18, 1941

TO: Honolulu                                                                                      # 113.

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein; Area “N” Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay, and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.)

Trans.  12-5-41

No. 283

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          November 20, 1941

TO: Honolulu                                                                                      # 111.

Strictly secret.

Please investigate comprehensively the fleet —– bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation.

Trans. 12-4-41

No. 284

FROM: Honolulu (Kita)                                                                       November 24, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 234.

Part 1 of 2. Strictly secret.

Re your #114[a].

1. According to normal practice, the  http://Louis1J1Sheehan1Esquire.us  fleet leaves Pearl Harbor, conducts maneuvers and forthwith returns.

2. Recently, the fleet has not remained for a long period of time nor conducted maneuvers in the neighborhood of Lahaina Roads. Destroyers and submarines are the only vessels who ride at anchor there.

3. Battleships seldom, if ever, enter the ports of Hilo, Hanalei, or Kaneohe. Virtually no one has observed battleships in maneuver areashttp://Louis1J1Sheehan1Esquire.us

4. The manner in which the fleet moves:

Battleships exercise in groups of three or five, accompanied by lighter craft. They conduct maneuvers for roughly one week at sea, either to the south of Maui or to the southwest. Aircraft carriers maneuver by themselves, whereas sea plane tenders operate in concert with another

A-148

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

vessel of the same class. Airplane firing and bombing practice is conducted in the neighborhood of the southern extremity of the island of Kahoolawe.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans.  12-16-41

No. 285

FROM: Honolulu                                                                                 November 24, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 234.

Part 2 of 2.

The heavy cruisers in groups of six carry on their operations over a period of two to three weeks, doubtless going to Samoa. The length of time that they remain at anchor in Pearl Harbor or tied up at docks is roughly four or five days at a stretch.

The light cruisers in groups of five spend one to two weeks in operations. It would seem that they carry on their maneuvers in the vicinity of Panama.

The submarines go out on 24-hour trips Monday, Wednesdays, and Fridays.

The destroyers, in addition to accompanying the principal units of the fleet, carry on personnel training activities in the waters adjacent to Hawaii.

Mine layers (old-style destroyers) in groups of —–, have been known to spend more than three weeks in operations in the Manila area.

Furthermore, on the night of the 23rd, five mine layers conducted mine laying operations outside Manila harbor.

Trans.  12-16-41

No. 286

FROM: Honolulu                                                                                 November 28, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 238.

Military report:

(1) There are eight “B-17” planes at Midway and the altitude range of their anti-aircraft guns is (5,000 feet?).

(2) Our observations at the Sand Island maneuvers are: number of shots—12; interval of flight—13 seconds; interval between shots—2 minutes; direct hits—none.

(3) 12,000 men (mostly marines) are expected to reinforce the troops in Honolulu during December or January.

(4) There has usually been one cruiser in the waters about (15,000 feet?) south of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance to the harbor.

Trans.  12-8-41

No. 287

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          November 28, 1941

TO: Honolulu                                                                                      # 119.

A-149

Re your message # 243[a].

Secret outside the Department.

Intelligences of this kind which are of major importance, please transmit to us in the following manner:

1. When battleships move out of the harbor if we report such movement but once a week the vessels, in that interval, could not only be in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands, but could also have traveled far. Use your own judgment in deciding on reports covering such movements.

2. Report upon the entrance or departure of capital ships and the length of time they remain at anchor, from the time of entry into the port until the departure.

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[a] Not available.

No. 288

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 29, 1941

TO: Honolulu                                                                                      #122.

Trans.  12-8-41

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

Trans.  12-5-41

No. 289

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          November 28, 1941

TO: Honolulu                                                                                      # 118.

(Priority.)

Re your # 232[a].

To be handled in government code.

Anticipating the possibility of ordinary telegraphic communication being severed when we are about to face the worst of situations, these broadcasts are intended to serve as a means of informing the diplomats in the country concerned of that situation without the use of the usual telegraphic channels. Do not destroy the codes without regard to the actual situation in your locality, but retain them as long as the situation there permits and until the final stage is entered into.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans.  12-7-41

No. 290

FROM: Honolulu (Kita)                                                                       December 1, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 241.

A-150

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

(In 2 parts complete.)

Re your # 119[a]

Report on ship maneuvers in Pearl Harbor:

1. The place where practice maneuvers are held is about 500 nautical miles southeast of here.

Direction based on:

(1) The direction taken when the ships start out is usually southeast by south and ships disappear beyond the horizon in that direction.

(2) Have never seen the fleet go westward or head for the “KAIUI” straits northwards.

(3) The west sea of the Hawaiian Islands has many reefs and islands and is not suitable as an ocean maneuver practice sea.

(4) Direction of practice will avoid all merchant ship routes and official travel routes.

Distance based on:

(1) Fuel is plentiful and long distance high speed is possible.

(2) Guns cannot be heard here.

(3) In one week’s time, (actually the maneuvers mentioned in my message #231[b] were for the duration of four full days of 144 hours), a round trip to a distance of 864 nautical miles could be reached (if speed is 12 knots), or 1152 miles (if speed is 16 knots), or 1440 nautical miles (if speed is 20 knots) is possible, however, figuring on 50% of the time being used for maneuver technicalities, a guess that the point at which the maneuvers are held would be a point of about 500 miles from Pearl Harbor.

2. The usual schedule for departure and return of the battleship is: leaving on Tuesday and returning on Friday, or leaving on Friday and returning on Saturday of the following week. All ships stay in port about a period of one week.

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[a] See IV, 287.

[b] Not available.

Trans.  12-10-41

No. 291

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          December 2, 1941

TO: Honolulu                                                                                      # 123.

(Secret outside the department.)

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.

Trans.  12-30-41

No. 292

FROM: Honolulu (Kita)                                                                       December 3, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 245.

(In 2 parts complete.)

A-151

Military secret.

From Ichiro Fujii to the Chief of # 3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters.

1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following:

a. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows:

Meaning Signal

Battleship divisions including scouts                                                                     Preparing to sortie  1

and screen units

A number of carriers                        Preparing to sortie                                         2

1. 3
2. 4
3. 5
4. Battleship divisions                           All departed between 4th and 6th.                6
5. 7

Carriers                                             All departed between 4th and 6^th.                 8

2. Signals.

a. Lanikai [a] Beach. House will show lights during the night as follows:

Signal

1. 1
2. 2
3. 3
4. 4

b.

1. 5
2. 6
3. 7
4. 8

Part 2.

c. Lanikai[a] Bay, during daylight.

If there is a “star” on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates signals 1, 2, 3, or 4.

If there is a “star” and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8.

D. Lights in the attic window of Kalama House [b] will indicate the following:

Times                                 Signal

1900 – 2000                       3

2000 – 2100                       4

2100 – 2200                       5

2200 – 2300                       6

2300 – 2400                      7

0000 – 0100                      8

e. K.G.M.B. [c] Want Ads.

A. Chinese rug etc. For sale, apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6.

B. CHICH..GO farm etc. Apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7.

C. Beauty operator wanted etc. Apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 5 or 8.

3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made from Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium [d] at a point halfway between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road (latitude 20° 40’N, longitude 156° 19’W., visible from seaward to the southeast and southwest of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be made daily until your EXEX signal is received:

A-152

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Times                                          Signal

From 7 – 8                                   3 or 6 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

From 8 – 9                                   4 of 7

From 9 – 10                                 5 or 8

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[a] Between Waimanalo and Kailua Beaches on east coast of Oahu.

[b] A beach village on east coast of Oahu, 1 mile northwest of Lanikai.

[c] A radio broadcast station in Honolulu.

[d] At latitude 20-42-45 N., longitude 156-20-20 W.

Trans.  12-11-41

No. 293

FROM: Honolulu (Kita)                                                                       December 3, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 247.

Ship report.

2nd. Military transport (name unknown) sailed out toward mainland.

3rd. RARIN came into port from San Francisco.

Trans.  12-10-41

No. 294

FROM: Honolulu (Kita)                                                                       December 3, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 248.

Ship report.

December 3rd. Wyoming and 2 seaplane tenders left port. No other movement.

Trans.  12-10-41

No. 295

FROM: Honolulu (Kita)                                                                       December 4, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 249.

On the afternoon of the 3rd, one British gunboat entered Honolulu Harbor. She left port early on the morning of the 4th. She was roughly of the 1,100 tons class. She had but one funnel and carried one 4 inch gun fore and aft. —– —–.

Furthermore, immediately after the vessel entered port, a sailor took some mail to the British Consular Office and received some mail in return.

Trans.  12-12-41

No. 296

FROM: Honolulu (Kita)                                                                       December 5, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 252.

A-153

(1) During Friday morning, the 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my message #289[a] arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days.

(2) The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.

(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th:

8 battleships

3 light cruisers

16 destroyers Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Four ships of the Honolulu class and —— were in dock.

---

[a] Not available.

Truk, Palau, Jaluit, and Saipan 1.tpjs.01 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

No. 82

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     11 November 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 764.

(In 3 parts complete.)

1. On the 11th, the British Ambassador, while calling on me on some other business, brought up the subject of the conversations. He advised me that he reported my talks of the other day (see contents of 2 of my message #723 [a]) to his home government, to which his government replied along the following lines, he said:

“The British Government is not aware of the details of the conversations being conducted in Washington. Since its success would be of interest to Britain and Japan, it is fervently hoping for the success thereof. However, unless the basis of discussion is first settled upon, it would be useless to go ahead and enter into negotiations of the details. The British Government feels that discussions as to the basic principles could safely be left up to the U. S. Government. However, as soon as the real negotiations begin, the United States is to confer with Great Britain according to arrangement. Therefore, when that time arrives, negotiations will be carried on jointly with the United States and Japan.”

2. I replied that in the matters being discussed between Japan and the United States there were some phases which greatly affected Great Britain. In the event of an agreement between Japan and the United States, Japan will simultaneously seek Britain’s agreement. I wish to arrange matters so that the two agreements may be signed at exactly the same time. In view of the fact that to do the above is necessary, we have already requested the United States to give their approval to the terms, I said to the British Ambassador.

The British Ambassador said that he was not aware as to how much progress had been made between the United States and Japan, but he assumed that they were still in the preliminary stages.

I, therefore, replied that his assumption may have fitted in the past, but that at present they had already entered into the realm of the actual negotiations. Moreover, the Imperial Government has already submitted its final proposal, thus bringing the negotiations to the final phase. We have made this fact absolutely clear to the United States, I added.

I went on to say that I hear that the British Prime Minister made a speech at a luncheon given by the Mayor of London in which he stated that though he did not know the developments in the U. S.-Japanese negotiations, he would issue a warning to Japan. Would it not be more to the point, I challenged, if, instead of making threats without knowing of what he spoke, he were to try to more clearly understand the issues and to cooperate in an effort to clear them up? However, I said, with the U. S.-Japanese talks in the phase they are today, and in view of the fact that I realize that there were certain relationships between the United States and Great Britain, I have no intention of urging or opposing British participation in these talks at this time.

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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

The Imperial Government has made the maximum concessions she can in drawing up its final proposal, I explained. We are of the opinion that the United States will find no objectionable points in it. I believe that it will be possible to sign the agreement within a week or ten days, I said. If, unfortunately, the United States refuses to accept those terms, it would be useless to continue the negotiations.http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.US Our domestic political situation will permit no further delays in reaching a decision.

I am making superhuman efforts at this time, I pointed out, in the attempt to ride out the crisis in the U. S.-Japanese and the British-Japanese relations. There are factions in the country which insist that there is no need for negotiating and point out the uselessness of doing so. The negotiations are being continued only after these factions were checked.

For these reasons, it is absolutely impossible that there be any further delays.

A speedy settlement can be made depending entirely upon the attitude of Britain and the United States, I said, and suggested that his country give serious consideration to this, and cooperate in bringing about an early agreement.

In the above manner, I pointed out the criticalness of the situation. The Ambassador listened to what I said very attentively, giving indications that he was realizing for the first time how critical the situation was. He advised me that he would send his government a report of the above conversation and that he himself would do his best to bring about a speedy settlement.

3. Thus, there are indications that the United States Government is still under the impression that the negotiations are in the preliminary stages and that we are still merely exchanging opinions. This is further supported by the words of President Roosevelt reported by you in your message # 1070 [b] (that part in which he says that he hopes that these preliminary discussions will lead to the basis of the real negotiations, etc.)

That the United States takes this lazy and easy going attitude in spite of the fact that as far as we are concerned, this is the final phase, is exceedingly unfortunate. Therefore, it is my fervent hope that Your Excellency will do everything in your power to make them realize this fact and bring about an agreement at the earliest possible moment.

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[a] See IV, 16.

[b] See IV, 76-79.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 83

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             11 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1072.

In paragraph (2) of your message #726 [a], in which you explain our Proposal A, you stated that with regard to the matters involving the Tripartite Pact, the United States was “apparently satisfied in general with our proposal and therefore . . .”

In your message #757 [b], in which you give us the gist of your explanations to the U. S. Ambassador, you say under paragraph (1) concerning the attitudes of the respective countries with reference to the European War that “we assume that this matter has already been settled with their acceptance of this phase of our proposal of 25 September”.

I presume that you took this position to press our claims on this particular point. We are proceeding under this assumption. Actually, however, no agreement has been reached as may be seen from the contents of their “oral statement” of 2 October.

The only comment I ever made in this respect was in my message #995 [c] in reporting Wakasugi’s conversations with Welles, when it was noted that regarding the Tripartite Pact,

A-41

“the United States also gave indications that adjustments in this matter may be a possibility”. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

As we replied in our message #1025 [d] to the question contained in your #721 [e], we are proceeding with the exchange of notes plan without coming to any definite decision on this point.

I merely mention the above, so that no misunderstandings will arise.

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[a] See IV, 25.

[b] See IV, 68.

[c] See IV, 8.

[d] See IV, 19.

[e] See IV, 18.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 84

FROM: Washington                                                                             11 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1073.

The Chinese Ambassador to the United States had an audience with the President yesterday the 10th and is said to have handed him a document (contents unknown). (It is said the interview lasted two minutes.)

This might be of some information to you.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 85

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             12 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1076.

Re your # 727 [a].

In order that we may have a dependable translation into English of Proposal B, please have it written in English and wire it to me.

The word “provided” in my #1044 [b] (text concerning the principle of non-discrimination in commerce) ought really to be changed to “on the understanding”. Please take care of that.

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[a] See IV, 29.

[b] See IV, 37.

Trans. 11-22-41

No. 86

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             12 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1077.

(Part 1 of 4.)

From the Intelligence Official.

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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

1. The ROOSEVELT administration is dashing along the road of military, economic, and industrial reconstruction with the object of defeating the Nazis. So far as war on the sea is concerned, the United States has already entered the conflict. Even if ROOSEVELT should now decide to leave the Nazis be, he is already in too deep. Even though he tried to do a 180° turn, his economic reconstructionists would not let him. Therefore, it can be said that the United States is following the one road to complete war.

2. It is true that the American army is not yet equipped, but even if war were declared against Germany, no more than the present ocean fighting would be necessary and, therefore, such a declaration is possible. The reason why things are not going so well for the administration in this connection, however, is because the people are not completely behind it.

ROOSEVELT has the full support of the government, the military, and the Congress and is tantamount to a dictator (on the 10th, the Times Herald said in an editorial that ROOSEVELT is a dictator in no way less than HITLER or STALIN). The people, however, most certainly do not support ROOSEVELT. During the last two or three weeks this has been particularly evident. Let us look into some concrete examples: Accordingly to reliable reports, the leaders of the America First Committee are secretly endeavoring with all their ingenuity to impeach ROOSEVELT. The stronger government pressure against it becomes, the more belligerent does this committee grow, and it may well be that the time will come when they will resort to force. The pressure of the government against the America First Committee is also becoming fierce. On October 30 in New York, there was a meeting of this committee, but they could not make any radio broadcasts. ROOSEVELT’s own life is in grave danger. On that night in Madison Square Garden, the immense crowd totaling 8,000 filled the building to overflowing.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 87

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             12 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1077.

(Part 2 Of 4.)

At a mass meeting in Washington, _____ [a] a former Ambassador, made a scathing attack on the ROOSEVELT regime and demanded a referendum against this deliberate drift toward war. On that occasion he said that at this so fateful moment in the nation’s history ROOSEVELT might die. These were words of profound meaning and drew great applause from the audience. The Times Herald in an editorial said that the President holds the whip over the Army and Navy and has the full support of the Government. Therefore, it will be impossible for the Congress to impeach him. The editorial said, however, that some believe that he will be impeached, in any case, later on. Now, for papers in their editorials to use the word “impeach” cannot be overlooked as something light. Furthermore, pickets in front of the White House recently carried placards on which were written the words “Impeach the President”.Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Another thing, some days ago in Detroit, Ambassador HALIFAX was pelted with eggs. Again the sinking of the REUBEN JAMES gave the popular spirit of this country a great shock and filled the people with a gloomy foreboding. In his speech on October 27th, ROOSEVELT did not stress foreign questions so much as he did internal matters. This is to be regarded as a declaration of internal warfare whereby ROOSEVELT whipped from its scabbard the sword of an unlimited national emergency.

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[a] DoD Comment: Name and identifying information withheld.

Trans. 11-14-41

A-43

No. 88

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             12 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1077.

(Part 3 of 4.)

2. The Congress, as I said, is supporting ROOSEVELT. True enough, the Senate approved the entrance of armed merchantmen into the war zones; however, the actual figures were 50 to 37, and this could not, by any means, be called a crushing defeat for the opponents. This also may be regarded as a reflection of public opinion.

Things being as they are in the country, in order to dispel the dilemma and to condition the people for a war against Germany, it may be now that a counter-hand will be played. I mean to say, many people in the United States fear the German war machine frightfully. However, they know how we have fought so hard in China for four years and figure that we are about worn out. They also figure that we are weak in materials. They do not think that we could resist them very much and optimize over how quick we would be to come to our knees.

If we scrutinize this psychology closely, we find that the ROOSEVELT administration, although it does not want a two-ocean war, would probably not do anything to prevent the outbreak of a war with Japan, depending on how we Japanese act. Perhaps a point-blank declaration of war might be made. Then the people’s thirst for blood could be stimulated, an unlimited emergency declared, the America First Committee dispersed, and all opposition crushed. Then they figure the popular mind might turn favorable for a war with Germany. In other words, we Japanese would be merely the tool with which the American administration prepares the way for coming to grips with the Reich.

4. What will happen if the United States and Japan come to blows? Well, Germany now has a vast occupied territory and is in the most favorable position to talk peace. England is already complaining that the United States is not sending her enough help. Germany, of course, does not want a long war, and she may suddenly, on unexpectedly generous terms, conclude peace with England. I mean to say that while the United States would be at grips with us, American aid to England would naturally slow down and give Germany a chance to make a separate peace with Great Britain. Germany will certainly do her best to achieve this feat.

Trans. 11-15-41

No. 89

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             12 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1077.

(Part 4 of 4.)

The New Deal failed, and the opposition to ROOSEVELT within the country became unmanageable. Just then the European war took a more lively turn through Germany’s invasion of the Netherlands. ROOSEVELT, who is well-versed in international questions, joined the war then and there. It might be said that HITLER’s attack on the Netherlands caused ROOSEVELT to enter the struggle immediately. Japanese-American relations are now at identically that same pass. I mean to say that a war with Japan would put the people squarely behind ROOSEVELT and make him a dictator. He knows fully that if he has to fight, there will be a suitable opportunity which would not admit delaying war.http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.US Furthermore, in view of Japan’s foreign policy, it can be seen that our relations with the United States have reached such a pass that a decision on war is about the only thing that could

A-44

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

raise them from the dead. Judging from internal conditions in the United States, for the foregoing reasons there is no hope for a thorough-going pact at the present time.Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire It would be better to devise some relatively easy small-scale makeshift of a temporary nature laying stress on economic matters. Germany will keep sinking American ships, and the President’s position will become harder and harder, so as soon as a show-down with Germany is inevitable, then we can get a full-fledged pact. Again, if we do have to fight the United States, we could do this much better after she is at war with Germany.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 90

From United States Communications Intelligence:

Important summaries of Japanese Naval operations.

Date of Operations      Serial                                 Date of Issue

1. Oct. 13-22, 1941               16-41, No. 907-100           Nov. 12, 1941

Oct. 17

“Numerous new calls are now appearing in Mandate traffic which indicate a decided increase in the Mandate Force.”

Oct. 18

“It has been noted with interest during past few days that the Mandate Islands of Truk, Palau, Jaluit, and Saipan have been included in dispatch headings which ordinarily do not concern them”.

“The Commander Sixth Base Force originates a dispatch addressed to four unidentified units now at Yokosuka, and information to 6th Base Force. All of the above action addresses are evidently new units scheduled for assignment to the 6th Base Force in Jaluit area.”

No. 91

FROM: Washington                                                                             11 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1074.

Re your # 762 [a].

After my conversation with the President, I told HULL that as the situation is urgent, I would like to meet him the same evening or this morning, and go on with concrete discussion. He replied that they understand fully our need of haste, that, as a matter of fact both yesterday after our conversation and today, although it is the 11th and the Armistice holiday, he would gather those concerned and give study to our proposal, and that it would facilitate the negotiations to have our discussion tomorrow the 12th after hearing their opinions.

As for a conjecture regarding the success or failure of the negotiations, I will —— after getting their opinions in tomorrow’s interview.

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[a] See IV, 80.