No. 456
louis j. sheehan, esquire
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 16, 1941
TO: Rio de Janeiro # 147.
Semi‑official employee KASAHARA, accompanied by his family, is leaving Yokohama on the Loan on the 24th, for his new post.
Trans. (Not dated)
No. 457
FROM: Santiago (Kawasaki) July 18, 1941
TO: Lima # 21.
Message from Tokyo # 75.
Lieut. Col. HARUO TESHIMA is appointed Military Attaché to Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia as of the 16th. Lieut. KOKO is relieved.
Translator’s note: Lieut. Col. TESHIMA does not speak Spanish but speaks English fluently. He has spent several years as Military Attaché in India.
Trans. 7‑29‑41
No. 458
FROM: Sao Paolo (Hara) August 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 81.
I arrived on the 2nd and have completed taking over of the duties from NARUSE. Am reporting by letter to the Embassy in Brazil.
Trans. 8‑12‑41
No. 459
FROM: Rio (Ishii) August 4, 1941
TO: Santiago # 5.
Rear Admiral SAKAMAKI and Commander NAITŌ left Sao Paulo on the 6th and Buenos Aires on the ? by (Conelor?) plane for your place. They will not make connections with the Rokuyō Maru. Please make arrangements so that they will catch the Shuyō Maru without fail. (Request Message.)
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 460
FROM: Rio (Ishii) August 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 317.
From Rear Admiral SAKAMAKI to Vice‑Minister of the Navy.
The schedule of movements of Commander NAITO and myself are as follows:
By air arriving Buenos Aires on the 6th and Santiago on the 11th. Taking the Heiyo Maru at Valparaiso.
This has been transmitted to Argentina, Chile and Peru. (Request message.)
Trans. 8‑15‑41
No. 461
FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) July 22, 1941
TO: Los Angeles # 1.
Please mail me ten copies of the pamphlet entitled Americanism issued by the Central Japanese Society of your city. Also several copies of any such pamphlets which may be issued in the San Francisco area. Also please telegraph me briefly the impressions and comments on these pamphlets by the first generation Japanese. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG
Trans. 3‑11‑41
No. 462
FROM: Rio (Ishii) June 26, 1941
TO: Santiago # 153.
(Circular)
(Message to Tokyo # 224.)
(Part 4 of 4) [a].
4. The United States seems to be in a quandary as to how best handle the existing government and it is being said that in ‑‑‑‑‑ circles she is using the ‑‑‑‑‑ Integralistas Party (the American Ambassador GAFFERY has the reputation of being a person well versed in the control of instigators of revolution). It seems that, with a view of frightening VARGAS, America recently had her hand in the matter of bringing former President WASHINGTON RUIZ out of many years of retirement following his expulsion by VARGAS. There are many who profess such theories. Furthermore, the United States, taking advantage of the corruption of Brazilian ‑‑‑‑‑ circles, is using large sums of money. Without a doubt, their “infiltration” is quite deep rooted. Many say that the President’s authority is wasting away.
Among the ABC powers of South America, Brazil is the most vulnerable to the pressures applied to her by the United States. This being the case, it is regrettable that the Axis is not taking counter‑policies to combat it.
[a] Parts 1, 2, and 3 not available.
Trans. 9‑20‑41
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No. 463
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) July 30, 1941
TO: Sao Paulo. # 66.
Re your message # 60 [a].
We have no objections to the establishment of youth training centers. However, in actually putting these into operation, should we intend to set up Japanese teachers to instruct Japanese residents in Brazil in a manner similar to the instruction given Japanese here, in the light of current Brazilian policy it seems to me that it is necessary to take progressive steps in order to forestall suspicion on the part of the Brazilian authorities. Not only that, but I believe that it is advisable to give a great deal of study to the possibilities of the dismemberment of our cultural dissemination associations and our general counter‑policy to such measures. This sort of an enterprise might put a curse upon our total policies toward Brazil should we put its budget and actual operation directly in the hands of our diplomatic offices in Brazil. On the other hand, we would insist on having direct supervision in the hands of the diplomatic officials only to the point of setting up the organization. Our policy now is to postpone, for a short time, the question of disbursing subsidy funds because we would like to have the functioning of the organization dependent on the instructor’s personal merits.
Furthermore, after you have referred to the similar opinions expressed in secret message # 156, please wire the Ministry of Overseas Affairs what you intend to do.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 10‑15‑41
No. 464
FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) July 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 299.
Re your circular # 1366 [a].
1. We have been burning all secret papers, including telegrams, official letters, etc., dated up to the end of 1934, and have taken precautions so that the other papers may be burned at any time. We have also instructed the offices under our jurisdiction to do likewise.
2. Since the possibility is increasing of all steamship services between Japan and this country being given up, and in view of the present international situation, we would like to send the Imperial portraits in care of the captain of the Nan‑A Maru which is scheduled to stop at Rio de Janeiro on August 5. I would like to have the portraits in the other offices under our jurisdiction sent back in care of one of the ships which are sailing southward with a view of proceeding by way of the Straits of Magellan.
[a] In which Tokyo says that in view of the present international situation the Imperial portrait should be carefully protected, and that there is no objection to returning it to Japan. Also, if the occasion demands, code books and secret documents should be burned, but this should not be done too soon as it would inconvenience communication.
Trans. 8‑15‑41
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No. 465
FROM: Santiago (Kawasaki) June 2, 1941
TO: Buenos Aires, Washington, and Rio de Janeiro # 31.
Circular.
(Message to Tokyo as # 111. )
(1st) I understand that the other day a member of the Chilean Military Commission confidentially informed the German Ambassador that in reply to a request by the United States for the use of the Straits of Magellan, the Chilean Government replied that in view of this country’s peace policy, this would not be possible.
Trans. 6‑21‑41
No. 466
FROM: Santiago (Kawasaki) June 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 116.
Part 1 of 3.
1. On the 2nd, I questioned ERASURISU [a], a member of Congress, and he gave the following as his view of the matter:
Because the United States had begun to prevent, by refusal to issue permits, export from that country of materials which she considers necessary and vital, Chile also has had to resort to the same method. The Conservative Party would have to approve of this action if it is to keep in step with the general trend of affairs. However, since he already realizes the importance of trade and ‑‑‑‑‑ with Japan, when the question comes up at the plenary session on the 10th, he would speak against any proposal that would place obstacles in the way of trade with Japan.
[a] Kana spelling.
Trans. 6‑21‑41
No. 467
FROM: Santiago (Kawasaki) June 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 116.
Part 2 of 3.
2. I met and discussed the matter with Chairman DEYURAN [a] and learned that what he was consulted on by the Foreign Minister had to do principally with the question of re-exportation. He stated that he thought there would hardly be a possibility of a total embargo being placed on export to Japan of such items as minerals, but that inasmuch as it is not easy to ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑- they would probably prohibit re-exportation of (war materials?), institute the license system and reserve themselves materials needed by (the) industries (in this country?) He promised, however, that he would make an effort toward having a clause inserted to the effect that no export limitation would be placed on such items so long as there is a surplus of them.
[a] Kana spelling.
Trans. 6‑21‑41
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No. 468
FROM: Santiago (Kawasaki) June 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 116.
Part 3 of 3.
3. Although the bill has not yet been announced to the ‑‑‑‑‑, I had an opportunity confidentially to peruse it in advance and found that under the date of the 31st, it dealt principally with two points; re-exportation and the export license system and that (the supporters) were strongly urging its early passage.
I understand that during the debate held on the 4th, they even had voted against referring the bill to a committee.
4. Senator BARESU [a] (a Mitsubishi advisor), I understood, spoke quite pessimistically about the prospect.
5. I expect to confer with the Foreign Minister within the next two or three days. I am wiring you this much for your information.
[a] Kana spelling.
Trans. 6‑21‑41
No. 469
FROM: Santiago (Kawasaki) June 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 118.
(In 2 parts‑complete)
Convey the following to RYOSHA:
“Cobaltera” has secured the following definite proposals and requests immediate instructions as to whether or not to accept them.
(1) For a period of 5 years they are given the handling of the entire annual output of ore for Japan.
(2) Ore of 1% content and up will be loaded in bulk, and refined ore of 5% and up will be put in bags and delivered F.O.B. at Huasco or Coquimbo.
(3) Price to be fixed every six months by mutual agreement taking into account the Canadian prices, the general market, actual costs of mining, etc.
(4) In the event such agreement is not reached, it will be permissible to sell to a third party on a 15 day notice; however, the Japanese reserve the right to accept within this period after reconsideration.
(5) Settlement for the first year’s production of ore of a minimum of 1% grade, will be made at Huasco at one dollar per unit (one pound of pure cobalt), but in the case of ore of 5% and up settlement will be made later.
(6) In case any ore should remain unshipped after six months from the time of its arrival at Huasco interest at the rate of 6% per annum is to be paid on the original cost price; the company is to do its best to ship at least 30 tons per month of ores of 1% grade and up.
(7) Previous to shipping, samples of the ore are to be taken out, at the expense of the purchaser.
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(8) 80% of the price will be paid on the basis of estimates made from ship loading papers. The weighing and collecting of samples is to be done in the presence of a representative of the seller, and in the case of those in Japan, this is final, and the balance will be paid when the weight and analysis has been ascertained.
(9) The analysis of the Japan mint shall be final, and in the case of any great discrepancy, the Ledoux analysis is to be the arbiter.
(10) Immediately upon the conclusion of the contract, a loan of one million pesos will be made to the company from the Japanese, on the condition that it be used directly in the development of mines. This is to be paid back in 5 years with interest at 6%. Payments to be made by deducting 10% from the purchase price. In case of sale to a third party, 15% is to be deducted from purchase price to pay on the loan.
(11) The mine‑lots are to be written into the contract as security for the loan. However, as the first mortgage on these is held by the Bureaus of Industries, this will be a second mortgage.
(12) If it is impossible to pay up the principal and interest in the five years, the sole agency contract will be extended until the full payment can be made.
(13) If four months elapse after ore reaches Huasco without shipment having been made, 80% of the price is to be paid.
Inasmuch as there has been a great deal of delay in waiting for them to make up their minds in regard to stock investment privileges, rates, the dispatch of engineers, etc., we would like to see this contract concluded at once. (Request message.)
Trans. 6‑20‑41
No. 470
FROM: Santiago (Kawasaki) July 1, 1941
TO: Rio, Lima, Panama, Washington, Buenos Aires # 43.
(Circular)
Message to Tokyo # 158.
Since the beginning of the German‑Soviet conflict, the attitude of the Communist Party here has radically changed.http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG
In the Houses of Parliament, too, speeches proposing aid to the Soviet are being made. Throwing the peace and order of the past into disruption, they, together with the pro‑American wing of the Socialist Party, are creating dissention. Joining the front of democracy, the Communist Party has forgotten its age‑old war against British and American capitalism and is taking a strong editorial stand which is principally anti‑German. Though they have planned street demonstrations, the Government’s control of such demonstrations is strict and on each occasion they have been dispersed.
Among the moving pictures shown, anti‑German ones have been banned. The ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑ -‑‑‑‑, realizing the increasing influence of the Communist Party, is attacking it as presenting an unpatriotic threat to the Government. The influential newspaper “Mercurio” like the “‑‑‑‑-ya”, however, is printing in large headlines the prediction of the ultimate defeat of the Soviet. This matter is evoking a great deal of attention.
Trans. 7‑11‑41
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No. 471
FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) June 10, 1941
TO: Washington # 70.
(Circular).
(Message to Tokyo # 198.)
Re my 183 [a].
On the 12th, the Chief of the Trade Bureau, I understand, told NAKAMURA [b] that the presidential decree issued the other day would have no unfavorable effect on Japan, inasmuch as Japan has a trade agreement with Argentina and that Japan need not be concerned because he was of the intention of bringing about a more satisfactory trade relation with Japan.
It seems to me that the United States has had something to do with this question.
Relayed to the United States and Brazil.
[a] Not available.
[b] Commercial Secretary. Japanese Legation, Buenos Aires.
Trans. 7‑11‑41
No. 472
FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) August 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 317.
Re your message # 1525 [a].
In view of the situation there has been a great increase in the number of request messages between firms here and their home offices and this is giving our telegraph personnel a great deal of trouble. I would like to have these request messages designated in the “Z” table. Please wire as soon as possible if this fits in with the procedure mentioned in your caption message.
[a] In which Tokyo sends out a circular giving instructions for controlling the use of wireless telegraphy and telephony for the purpose of increasing the efficiency of counter‑espionage work.
Trans. 10‑17‑41
No. 473
FROM: Bogota (Yanai) June 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 76.
(Part 1 of 2) [b]
In another message, I will wire you more of the details of the general situation in Ecuador; however, I thought I had better send you immediately the important impressions I obtained.
1. From the highest to the lowest, the people of Ecuador entertain the profoundest hatred for the Peruvians and there are many, many of them who expect Peru to attack them at any
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moment. Of all the countries in South America, Peru is the only (anti‑Axis power ?). The (British ?) who live in Peru earnestly trust that Peru is going to help them. Taking advantage of this situation, the United States has established propaganda headquarters in Guayaquil [a] and is spreading every day such fantastic stories as were never heard of in heaven or earth and the newspapers are publishing such stories serially day by day.
[a] Seaport and commercial city in Ecuador.
[b] See II, 475.
Trans. 6‑30‑41
No. 474
FROM: Bogota (Yanai) June 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 77.
Germans here in Colombia tell me that Nazi activities are not doing so well. Powerful government officials like the President, a former lawyer for British oil concerns, are turning in favor of England and the United States. Ecuador is looking to Washington for assistance against Peru.
Trans. 7‑12‑41
No. 475
FROM: Bogota (Yanai) June 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 76.
(Part 2 of 2)
I told you more about this in my # 17 [a] from Quito. When I talked with the Foreign Minister, as I told you in that message, he told me that the question of the Peruvian border was gradually growing more and more “grave”. In a quaking voice he said to me: “Peru is preparing for War.” http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG
2. Contrasted with her relations with Peru, Colombia’s relations with Ecuador are most amicable. As a matter of fact, save on Government buildings, both flags float jointly everywhere. You might say that the two countries are flying one banner. Now, I was to jointly serve in Peru but I prefer Ecuador. I inquired of the Ecuadorean Government from Bogota if it would be all right for me to represent my country there, as well as in Bogota, and they expressed great satisfaction. The Foreign Minister and all the officials expressed great approval.
[a] In which NAGUMA says he has explained to the Peruvian Foreign Minister that newspaper reports saying there were 8,000 Japanese troops connected with the border dispute, were unfounded. See II, 473 for part one.
Trans. 6‑30‑41
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No. 476
FROM: (Lima?) July 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 167.
This government has demanded an apology from Ecuador for the attack on the Guayaquil consulate as a preliminary to accepting the conditions proposed by the United States, Brazil, and Argentina. Ecuador has done this, and, therefore, this country will (1) withdraw its army to the line agreed upon by both countries in 1936; (2) this will be carried out under the direction of a joint military commission; (3) flying of military planes will be prohibited in the evacuated zone; (4) she will sign the various peace documents; (5) this government has announced that on the 16th it replied to the mediating powers that she agreed with the solution of the affair.
Trans. 7‑29‑41
No. 477
FROM: Lima (Sakamoto) June 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 152.
The Peruvian Government issued a presidential decree dated June 27th, to the effect that for reasons of the maintenance of neutrality, the entrance into Peruvian waters and harbors by submarines of belligerent powers was prohibited. Details following by mail.
Trans. 7‑25‑41
No. 478
FROM: Caracas (Ohgimi) July 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 67.
Foreign Office Secret.
The wife of the oldest son of the former president of this country received the information given below from the wife of the present president. The former passed the information on to her best friend, who is the wife (Venezuelan) of Yazawa, President of the Foreigner’s Association. louis j. sheehan, esquire
The President told his wife that all of the Central and South American Governments received a suggestion from the U.S. about three weeks ago, to apply the pressure on Japanese residing in their respective countries. Methods whereby these Japanese would be forced to leave the countries were pointed out to them. louis j. sheehan, esquire
We are at present making every effort to ascertain if there is any basis of fact in this.
Barcid 