THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
President Roosevelt opened his remarks by saying that he had just spent a few days enjoying life at sea, during which he had sailed on his yacht and afterwards transferred to a warship to keep a rendezvous at a point off the Maine coast. Then he began to discuss the current problems, reading from two papers which stated that the United States would immediately take any steps necessary for the protection of its interests and citizens, if Japan were to make further use of force. Furthermore, before Japan’s proposal for a meeting of both country’s leaders could be realized, the United States must be advised of the aims of the Japanese government. Upon finishing his remarks, President Roosevelt asked that Ambassador Nomura relay the contents of both messages to Japan with the understanding that the documents were not to be considered as oral statements but only as reference material. Ambassador Nomura then accepted the papers on the condition that they would be used solely for his own information.[66]
In the course of the conversation President Roosevelt stated that Secretary Hull, Ambassador Nomura and himself were striving to bring about peace in the Pacific, but no one else was. When Ambassador Nomura remarked that there were many other nations desiring war in the Pacific, President Roosevelt affirmed this and said that the United States, Britain, and probably Russia hoped for peace in the Pacific, but there were not many other nations which desired it.[67]
After joking about “our German friend” who maintained no warships in the Pacific, President Roosevelt stated that because none of the three men present had come up through the diplomatic ranks, they did not feel bound by diplomatic conventions. Therefore, the notes that he held in his hand were not diplomatic documents nor aide-memoires, but were merely expressions of what he wanted to say. The Japanese Ambassador remarked that though President Roosevelt had stated that he had no desire to commit these items to paper, yet the President seemed to feel that they needed to be expressed in writing.[68]
Informing President Roosevelt that the Japanese government was sincere in its desire to adjust Japanese-American diplomatic relations, Ambassador Nomura stated that the Japanese government would like to be advised concerning the possibility of arranging an interview with Prince Konoye, as well as the possibility of the continuation in the near future of the informal conversations which had been carried on during the past months.
Since the Japanese government had already expressed its opinion regarding the French Indo-Chinese question to the American Secretary of State, it felt that no clarifying explanations were necessary. Yet Prime Minister Konoye was still willing to exchange opinions with a view toward achieving world peace.
Asserting his country’s confidence in the statesmanship of President Roosevelt and in his ability to settle things, Ambassador Nomura stated that Japan would reciprocate in the fine type of statesmanship the United States would undoubtedly exercise. After listening closely to Ambassador Nomura’s summarization of the existing situation, President Roosevelt turned the conversation to the problem of finding a suitable location for the proposed conference. President Roosevelt stated that “Geographically speaking, it is impossible for me to go to Honolulu. I am not permitted to travel in an airplane.”[69] He suggested instead that the Japanese Prime Minister meet with him at Juneau, Alaska, as an alternate to either San Francisco or Seattle, Washington. To President Roosevelt’s inquiry as to the number of days it would take Prince Konoye to reach the suggested locations, Ambassador Nomura answered that it would take about ten days and that the climate would be favorable until about the middle of September.
[66] III, 40.
[67] III, 41.
[68] III, 42.
[69] III, 43.
[15]
President Roosevelt next pointed out certain revisions that had been made in the documents he held. He had crossed out the word “President” since the original text implied that President Roosevelt himself would attend the conference, and for geographic reasons this might not be possible. Furthermore, he added that while the United States did not welcome the “closed door” policy, which it had been forced to adopt because of Japanese actions, it remained firm in its statement that Japan itself must open the door in the present circumstances. At this point President Roosevelt turned to a discussion of French Indo-China.[70]
Throughout the entire conference Ambassador Nomura was favorably impressed with President Roosevelt’s tactful attitude and his high spirits. The Japanese Ambassador believed that President Roosevelt was exceptionally pleased with the responsiveness of the British people to the joint British-American peace terms arrived at in collaboration with Prime Minister Churchill. Unlike the Fourteen Articles issued independently by President Wilson during the last war, this agreement, the Atlantic Charter, had succeeded in drawing up peace terms acceptable to both England and America.
Before drawing the meeting to a close President Roosevelt mentioned Postmaster General Walker as being an ardent supporter of friendly Japanese-American relations. Apparently Mr. Waslker had spoken in behalf of the suggested interview between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye. As the conversation ended, Secretary Hull asked Ambassador Nomura to call him at any time. Since the Chinese Incident was regarded as a separate problem, it had not been mentioned at all in the day’s conversation.[71]
17. Ambassador Nomura Discloses His Personal Opinion Regarding the President’s Statements
Since President Roosevelt had asked to see him immediately upon his return to Washington, Ambassador Nomura was certain that the American President viewed Japanese-American relations in a grave light. From the contents of the statement concerning the determination of the United States to protect its interests against any further Japanese aggression and from the manner in which President Roosevelt read it during that meeting, it was evident to the Japanese Ambassador that the note had been prepared in advance of the President’s return.[72]
On the other hand, the second statement read by President Roosevelt seemed to contain his own attitude and opinions, and, accordingly, Ambassador Nomura believed that President Roosevelt favored the Japanese proposal under certain conditions. Yet when Ambassador Nomura had suggested that the situation depended largely on President Roosevelt’s statesmanship, the President answered that it was Japan’s responsibility to open the closed door. Ambassador Nomura was of the opinion, nevertheless, that President Roosevelt had other wishes, for he did not doubt that the American President hoped for a favorable change in Japanese-American relations.
According to recent comments in the newspapers, President Roosevelt was fearful lest the United States be drawn into a Far Eastern war, since he believed that there was an equal chance that Japan would attempt further aggression. Nevertheless, Ambassador Nomura was certain that the proposal for a meeting between the leaders of the two governments had considerably lessened the strain in diplomatic relations. However, it was essential that strict secrecy be maintained regarding this meeting, especially in Japan, for attempts would be begun there to make it impossible, if the news leaked out. Ambassador Nomura assured Tokyo that the matter was under careful study and that a full report would be made of any ideas of value.[73]
[70] III, 44.
[71] III, 45-47.
[72] III, 48.
[73] Ibid.
[16]
THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
18. Mr. Dooman Confers with Mr. Terasaki
On August 18, 1941 at 3:00 P.M. Mr. Terasaki, Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs, requested Mr. Eugene H. Dooman, Counselor of the American Embassy in Tokyo, to convey a private message to Ambassador Grew.[74] Stressing the importance of the interview to be held that afternoon at 4:00 P.M., between the Japanese Foreign Minister and Ambassador Grew, Mr. Terasaki’s note expressed the hope that the meeting would initiate a series of conversations for the adjustment of Japanese-American relations for he believed that if the Cabinet under Prince Konoye failed in this objective, all hope of reconciliation would be lost. He urged that criticism of the actions and policies of either government be avoided, and warned that though the Japanese government was ready to respond to any proposal of the United States to end the Far Eastern conflict, Japan would under no circumstances give in to American pressure.
Requesting Mr. Dooman to inform Ambassador Grew that there was much optimism in all influential quarters with regard to the outcome of the conversations, Mr. Terasaki hoped that the American Ambassador would do everything possible to achieve the desired results. The conversations were to be “off the record”, by which Mr. Terasaki meant that there would be no commitment on either side in regard to any question arising during the conversations.[75]
19. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (August 18, 1941)
(a) Ambassador Grew’s Report[76]
Ambassador Grew called on Foreign Minister Toyoda at the latter’s request at 4:00 P.M. on August 18, 1941. After first receiving assurance from Ambassador Grew that the matters under discussion would be treated with the greatest secrecy,[77] and that no reports would reach Germany or Italy, Admiral Toyoda began a long oral statement requiring two hours and a half for delivery, regarding the critical situation then existing between Japan and the United States. Declaring that Japan had moved troops into French Indo-China solely for the purpose of settling the China affair, Foreign Minister Toyoda insisted that Japan had been acting under its own initiative and that there was no basis for the drastic economic measures which the United States had taken against his country under the mistaken belief that Japan was acting at the instigation of Germany.
Japanese public opinion had become extremely excited but the government was doing all in its power to repress hostile press comment. Foreign Minister Toyoda stated that the Japanese reply to the President’s proposal of July 24, 1941 had been carefully drafted to meet the intentions of the American government, and that it contained proposals which would bind both governments. However, since the President’s proposal had dealt exclusively with the joint defense of Indo-China, the Japanese reply was also restricted to that subject and would deal with it independently of the Hull-Nomura conversations.
On August 8, 1941 Ambassador Nomura had received from Secretary Hull the American reply to the Japanese proposal, and the Japanese authorities were disturbed to note in it that the United States had attached little importance to Japan’s answer to President Roosevelt’s proposal. The American proposal had suggested the withdrawal of Japanese forces from French Indo-China as a prerequisite, although Japan had promised to withdraw after the China Incident was settled.
If the United States wanted peace in the Pacific, Japan suggested that America cooperate in settling the China Incident. Both Japanese and American statesmen were sincerely striving
[74] “Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)”, initialled by Eugene H. Dooman, August 18, 1941, S.D., II, 559-560.
[75] Ibid.
[76] “Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)”, August 18, 1941,
[77] S.D., II, 560-564.
[17]
for peace, according to the Japanese Foreign Minister, and to have a breakdown of peace occur now would be evidence of lack of statesmanship on both sides.
Both countries had a duty to save the world from disaster, and for this reason they must consider their mutual problems in a calm and friendly atmosphere on an equal basis.
Because present relations were extremely strained as a result of misunderstandings on both sides and sinister designs by other countries, it would be most opportune if the leaders of both countries could meet at Honolulu to discuss the situation in person.
Foreign Minister Toyoda said that he intended to have Ambassador Nomura see President Roosevelt in person to make this suggestion, and he requested Ambassador Grew to support this plan, which was unprecedented in Japanese history, since it involved the Premier’s going abroad and would be done despite the objections of certain Japanese elements.
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire . The Japanese Foreign Minister assured Ambassador Grew that the Prime Minister, Prince Konoye, would make every effort to save the world from ruin and to maintain peace in the Pacific, and he expressed his conviction that President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye would be able to reach an equitable agreement since Japan was not necessarily bound by the reply made on August 6 by Ambassador Nomura to President Roosevelt’s proposal of July 24, 1941. Foreign Minister Toyoda also stressed the necessity for avoiding any impression that Japan had entered into negotiations with the United States because of American pressure. He suggested, therefore, that both countries reciprocate in stopping or moderating various measures of economic pressure. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
In his report Ambassador Grew reiterated that he realized the great need for secrecy in this matter, and indicated that he appreciated the reasons for Japan’s negotiating through Ambassador Nomura in the United States rather than in Tokyo. However, he informed Foreign Minister Toyoda that in view of Japan’s progressive southward advance, the United States could be governed only by Japan’s actions and not by its words. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.INFO He also pointed out that previously Japan had ascribed its move into Indo-China as a reaction against encirclement by other powers but now it was ascribing it to the settling of the China affair. The Japanese Foreign Minister made no comment on the remarks of the American Ambassador. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.INFO
Ambassador Grew restated Mr. Hull’s opinion expressed by Mr. Welles on July 23, 1941 that there appeared to be no basis for continuing the conversations which had been carried on in Washington between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura. He also spoke of Mr. Hull’s statement to Ambassador Nomura on August 8, 1941 that the answer of Japan to the proposal of President Roosevelt failed in responsiveness. Though withholding official comment until the American government had time to study the proposal just made by the Japanese Foreign Minister, Ambassador Grew promised to give it his personal support,.[78]
(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda’s Report
It is believed that no detailed report of the conversation between Foreign Minister Toyoda and Ambassador Grew was forwarded to the Japanese Embassy at Washington. However, on August 21, 1941 the Japanese Foreign Minister briefly referred to this conversation in a message to Ambassador Nomura.[79]
Pointing out that if Japan and the United States were to surmount the crisis confronting them at present, it would be necessary to display real statesmanship, and reminding Ambassador Grew of his nine years of tireless work to maintain Japanese-American friendship, Foreign Minister Toyoda again strongly urged that the proposed conference of the leaders of the two nations take place.[80]
[78] “Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)”, August 18, 1941, S.D., II 560-564.
[79] III, 49.
[80] Ibid.
[81] “The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State”, August 18, 1941, S.D., II, 565.
[18]
THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
20. Ambassador Grew Urges Consideration of Japanese Proposal
In a report to Secretary Hull and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, Ambassador Grew urged that the new Japanese proposal be given the utmost consideration, since not only was such a suggestion unprecedented in Japanese history, but it indicated that Japan’s intransigence had not completely crystallized. Furthermore, Ambassador Grew believed that a meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt would be of incalculable value in bringing peace in the Pacific.[81]
21. Ambassador Nomura Is Convinced of President Roosevelt’s Sincerity
On August 20, 1941 Ambassador Nomura reported to Tokyo that in a recent conversation Postmaster-General Walker had stressed the fact that President Roosevelt had taken up the question of the proposed Japanese-American conferences immediately upon his return to Washington. Furthermore, by his past speeches and most recent statement, it was evident that President Roosevelt had a broad-minded view of the world situation and was in no way anti-Japanese in his feelings, and, therefore, Japan should reciprocate in a like manner.
When Ambassador Nomura responded that it was with strong resolution that the Japanese government had continued its dealings with the current problem, Mr. Walker emphasized that this was also true of President Roosevelt for even if there were no real justification, there was much anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States. If news of the proposed conference were to leak out, Congress would undoubtedly raise strong opposition to it. On the other hand, there was a great possibility of achieving peace in the Pacific, if the conference succeeded. In view of President Roosevelt’s present feeling, Mr. Walker asked that a way be found to settle successfully the Japanese-American question.[82]
On the following day, August 21, 1941, Ambassador Nomura advised Tokyo of further indications of President Roosevelt’s serious interest in the resumption of Japanese-American negotiations. According to rumors, the text of the note delivered to Ambassador Nomura on August 17, 1941[83] had been composed by President Roosevelt himself, and the President expected that a Japanese reply would be handed directly to him.
With this in mind, Ambassador Nomura was of the opinion that the Japanese reply should be in simple and direct phraseology. Referring to the text of his proposed reply to President Roosevelt’s note, Ambassador Nomura decided to omit such expressions as “continuance of encirclement” and “of discrimination of boycott and barriers of personal integrities and attack.” At the same time, however, Ambassador Nomura felt it essential that Japan emphasize the necessity of guaranteeing the safety of the Far East.[84]
22. Ambassador Nomura Suggests A New Proposal
In a message to Tokyo on August 20, 1941 Ambassador Nomura expressed the opinion that President Roosevelt, desirous of settling Japanese-American problems by a conference between the two government heads, had made this proposal as his last political move at the critical moment when Japanese-American relations were at their worst. Urging that Japan respond to the generous spirit exhibited by President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura asked Tokyo to leave decisions concerning concrete points in the proposals until some future date, thereby showing the American government that Japan would allow nothing to conflict with the successful resumption of the informal negotiations. On this basis, therefore, Ambassador Nomura submitted a proposal for approval by the Japanese government and subsequent delivery to the United States.[85]
[82] III, 50-51.
[83] III, 52-53.
[84] III, 54.
[85] III, 55.
[19]
By explaining the immutable policy of the Japanese government as seen in important statements issued by Prime Minister Konoye and Ministers Hiranuma, Arita, and Matsuoka, Ambassador Nomura’s proposal was designed to correct any misunderstandings arising from his government’s proposal. Because his document dealt only with those points included in the proposals of President Roosevelt on August 17, 1941, and did not pretend to be Japan’s policy, Ambassador Nomura believed that the United States would give it careful consideration as a means of reopening Japanese-American negotiations.[86]
Emphasizing that this opportunity to readjust the strained diplomatic situation must not be lost, Ambassador Nomura requested that his proposal be given careful consideration. If the proposed meeting between the government heads were to take place in the middle of September 1941, there remained less than two months time for preliminary negotiations. Japan must necessarily select a diplomatic staff and have a ship available before that time. In view of these reasons, Ambassador Nomura urged that the matter be decided upon without delay.[87]
23. Rumors of a British-American-Russian Conference Speed Japanese Action
On August 23, 1941 Tokyo informed Ambassador Nomura of newspaper reports concerning a British-American-Russian conference to be held early in September 1941. Since the United States was also reported to be shipping goods to Russia, Tokyo feared a realization of an Allied encirclement. If Japan were to arrange a conference between its leaders and the United States which would convene after the Allied meeting, the world would receive the impression that Japan had submitted to the threat of encirclement. In order to offset this reaction, Japan decided to submit an early reply to the American proposal and to arrange the conference between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye for an earlier date. The Japanese Foreign Office also requested Ambassador Nomura to inform the United States that the shipment of materials to Russia by way of Japanese coastal waters would produce an unfavorable effect on Japanese-American relations.[88]
24. Hull-Nomura Conversation (First-August 23, 1941)
(a) Secretary Hull’s Report[89]
To thank Mr. Hull for arranging his interview with President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura called on the American Secretary of State on August 23, 1941. The Japanese Ambassador said his government was carefully considering the American notes, and would respond in a few days. The two representatives once again stated their mutual desire to better Japanese-American relations.
Reiterating that America’s basic principles consisted of peace, law, justice and equality in its dealings throughout the world, Secretary Hull declared that Japan was pursuing the opposite course. During the past months, the government-controlled Japanese press had excited distrust of the United States and had acclaimed a program of unlimited expansion in establishing the “new order” in the Pacific, while war factions headed by Mr. Matsuoka had lauded the benefits of the Tripartite Pact. Considering these facts, Secretary Hull felt that American skepticism concerning Japan’s sincerity in seeking a peaceful settlement was justified.
Pointing to America’s lack of cooperation in its relations with his country, Ambassador Nomura cited as an example the shipment of oil to Vladivostok through Japanese waters. Faced with large Russian forces in that area, Japan could not be expected to ignore the reinforcement of Russian military supply bases across the border line.
[86] See III, 56-62 for text of this proposal which was not adopted by the Foreign Office.
[87] III, 63.
[88] III, 64. See Japanese-American Relations, Part C, Section 172, Japan Recognizes Russo-German War as Threat to Its Border.
[89] “Memorandum by the Secretary of State”, August 23, 1941. S.D., II, 565-567.
[20]
THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
After mentioning jocularly Japan’s non-aggression pact with Russia, which elicited no response but a laugh from Ambassador Nomura, Secretary Hull answered that the United States was concerned only with aiding any resistance to the German armies. Should Japan project itself militarily into the Russo-German situation, or any other situation affecting the United States, the entire situation would be changed.
To Ambassador Nomura’s query regarding the future sale of oil to Japan under the freezing system, Secretary Hull replied that his knowledge of the details was incomplete, but he promised to investigate the matter.[90]
(b) Ambassador Nomura’s Report
There is no separate message available referring to this conversation with Secretary Hull on August 23, 1941.
25. Hull-Nomura Conversation (Second-August 23, 1941)
(a) Secretary Hull’s Report[91]
Later in the day, on August 23, 1941, Ambassador Nomura returned to Secretary Hull’s apartment to inform him of a message from Japan concerning the proposed meeting between the heads of the two governments. Because of the reported Allied conferences at Moscow which were scheduled for early in September, the Japanese government was desirous of effecting this meeting earlier than the date, October 15, 1941, suggested by President Roosevelt.
Ambassador Nomura laughed very heartily when Secretary Hull remarked that the Japanese-Russian Neutrality Pact would give Japan all the assurances of Russian peaceful intentions that Japan would desire. Regardless of its non-aggression pact with Russia, Japan feared that some agreements entered into at Moscow might be detrimental to Japanese plans and policies. Secretary Hull, however, made no commitments of any kind in regard to this proposal.
(b) Ambassador Nomura’s Report[92]
In compliance with his orders, Ambassador Nomura called on Secretary Hull at 5:00 P.M. Saturday afternoon, August 23, 1941, to report that Japan was prepared to make an early reply to the statement of President Roosevelt. The Japanese Ambassador further suggested that the conference between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye be held at a date earlier than that previously proposed.
Following Tokyo’s other instructions, Ambassador Nomura asked that the United States delay its Moscow conference and withhold shipment of material to Russia for the time being. Although Secretary Hull refrained from making any comment regarding Ambassador Nomura’s suggestion for an early Japanese-American conference, he answered Ambassador Nomura’s remarks about Russia by pointing to the Neutrality Pact in existence between Japan and Russia. Secretary Hull assured Ambassador Nomura, however, that his statement would be relayed to the President. Ambassador Nomura believed that President Roosevelt, who was anxious to receive Japan’s reply, was the one most interested in holding a conference with Prince Konoye.[93]
[90] Ibid.
[91] “Memorandum by the Secretary of State”, August 23, 1941, S.D., II, 568.
[92] III, 65.
[93] Ibid.
[21]
26. Prime Minister Konoye Replies to President Roosevelt (August 26, 1941)
On August 26, 1941 the Japanese government sent Ambassador Nomura a reply to be communicated to President Roosevelt as soon as possible.[94] Expressing his satisfaction at President Roosevelt’s approval of the proposed leaders’ meeting, Prime Minister Konoye stated that since Japan and the United States held the key to world peace, deterioration of their relations would result in the downfall of world civilization. For this reason, Japan desired to improve the Japanese-American situation since the betterment of present conditions would achieve peace not only in the Pacific but throughout the world.
In Prime Minister Konoye’s opinion, Japanese-American relations had reached a critical stage because of a lack of mutual understanding intensified by the machinations of third powers. Consequently, both Japan and the United States continually doubted and misconstrued the other’s intentions. In order to eliminate these causes at their very source, Prime Minister Konoye desired to meet with President Roosevelt.[95]
Under the present circumstances in which rapid changes were constantly taking place and in which unforeseen conditions might possibly arise at any moment, Prime Minister Konoye did not believe that the previous informal negotiations were adequate any longer. It was necessary now for the two leaders to meet and discuss the possibility of saving the present situation by studying together the important questions affecting the entire Pacific area. Any minor details could then be settled by those officials specializing in such matters.
Eagerly waiting for the day of the meeting, Prime Minister Konoye urged that President Roosevelt accept the proposal in an understanding spirit. In view of various circumstances, the Japanese Prime Minister believed that the meeting should be held somewhere in the vicinity of Hawaii.[96]
27. Japan Replies to President Roosevelt’s Statement of August 17, 1941
On August 26, 1941 in a statement sent to Ambassador Nomura, the Japanese government replied to President Roosevelt’s note of August 17, 1941.[97] It reviewed the American claim that Japan’s actions in French Indo-China had removed the basis upon which the informal conversations concerning Pacific problems had been founded. In accordance with the principles embodied in the peace program which the United States advocated, Japan had been asked to abandon its expansionist activities and change its attitude. Furthermore, in asking that Japan submit a clearer statement of its present plans, the United States had emphatically stated that it would resort to any necessary steps to prevent Japan from dominating its neighboring countries by military power.[98]
In view of its past pledges and repeated explanations of its intentions toward other countries, Japan deeply regretted American mistrust of its actions. Solely on the basis of its own fundamental conception of the Pacific problem, the United States chose to regard certain Japanese measures as harmful to peace in that area. However, in view of the international confusion permeating the entire world, Tokyo felt that it was almost impossible to judge whether a certain incident was the cause or result of the situation.
[94] III, 66.
[95] III, 67. The English translation by Ambassador Nomura was sent to Tokyo on September 3, 1941, see III, 81-83. For the text received by the State Department, see “The Japanese Prime Minister (Prince Konoye) to President Roosevelt”, August 27, 1941, S.D., II, 572-573.
[96] III, 68.
[97] III, 69. For English translation by Ambassador Nomura sent to Tokyo on September 3, 1941 see III, 84-88. For text received by the State Department see “Statement by the Japanese government handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to President Roosevelt, August 28, 1941, S.D., II, 573-575. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.INFO
[98] Ibid.
[22]
THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
One-sided judgement of the situation by the United States, based upon only certain political facts, would be harmful to lasting peace. Since Japan thought it necessary to cope with anything that threatened its own peaceful progress and its own defense, the United States, before criticizing such defensive measures, must recognize the cause and correct the situation so that peace could be established.[99]
America considered certain Japanese measures as harmful to the principles which it upheld, but on the other hand Japan felt that the United States had placed certain obstacles in the path of Japan’s self-sufficiency and defense. Even during the informal conversations taking place between Japan and the United States, the American government had continuously applied a policy of pressure, thereby depriving Japan of many essential natural resources.
In the meantime many American newspaper articles and editorials predicted that the United States, Britain and the Netherlands East Indies would form an anti-Japanese front in the Far East. Although the United States might have acted in conformity with its own national requirements, this proved conclusively that actions considered to be just by one government might be detrimental to another. The United States apparently overlooked the fact that its natural circumstances and monopolistic power could well present a threat to another nation.[100]
President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull followed the course of peace, and, consequently, it was difficult for them to understand that peoples in other countries felt threatened by the United States. Yet nations less favorably situated, especially with regard to natural resources, were forced to consider their relations with the United States from a defensive viewpoint. In order to maintain peace the United States must refrain from criticizing the individual actions of other nations and instead attempt to understand the circumstances causing those actions. However, Japan was pleased that the United States had encouraged an exchange of opinions relating to the basis for an understanding which would result in lasting peace in the Pacific.[101]
In explaining its actions in the Southwest Pacific, Japan reiterated that its occupation of French Indo-China had not been taken with the intention of advancing by force into neighboring areas, but had been an act of self-defense to cope with threats against Japan’s right of existence. Since the China Incident had originated from a threat to Japan’s national existence, the ending of the war by the establishment of a just peace with China would find Japan willing to withdraw its troops immediately from French Indo-China. In view of this statement, Japan’s attitude toward Thailand was self-evident.
Turning to the problem of Japanese-Russian relations, Tokyo gave assurance that it would refrain from military action against Russia as long as that country observed the Russo-Japanese neutrality agreement by refraining from any threats to Japan and Manchukuo. In return, Japan earnestly requested that the United States refrain from any measures which would stimulate Japan’s fear of joint American-Russian action against it.[102]
Japan insisted that it whole-heartedly supported the principles laid down previously by the American government as a basis for conducting informal conversations with Japan, and agreed that their purpose was the conclusion of an understanding that would achieve a natural and peaceful settlement of problems in the Pacific area. By establishing such a peace in the Pacific, Japan joined with the United States in hoping that the principles set forth by both countries would be used towards the establishment of a world-wide peace. To maintain the necessary economical, political and military equality throughout this area, those countries which had superior natural resources and geographical locations must assume an attitude of
[99] III, 70.
[100] III, 71.
[101] III, 72.
[102] III, 73.
[23]
strict impartiality and must cooperate in the distribution of advantages to lesser nations. The spirit of reciprocity should govern any adjustments made in order to satisfy the essential requirements of all countries in that area.[103]
In summing up its reply to President Roosevelt’s statement, the Japanese government expressed the opinion that the principles which it had set forth were both clear and concise. Only by conferring together dispassionately and constructively on all problems relating to the interest of both countries could the United States and Japan hope to found a lasting peace; therefore, an immediate conference between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye was required. First, however, it would be necessary to eliminate the false impression that such a conference was due to pressure exerted on Japan by the United States.[104]
28. Japan’s Reply Contains Its Maximum Concessions
In a special message to Ambassador Nomura on August 26, 1941 the Japanese government explained that the reply outlined above contained its maximum concessions. Since both the situation in Japan itself, as well as that throughout the world was strained to the extreme, Tokyo urged Ambassador Nomura to convince the American officials of the necessity for an interview between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye, on which it was pinning its last hopes. It said that such a conference would not necessarily have to be bound by the statements made in Foreign Minister Toyoda’s message.[105]
(a) Secretary Hull’s Report[106]
Since Ambassador Nomura had received a reply from his government regarding President Roosevelt’s message to the Prime Minister of Japan,[107] Secretary Hull agreed on August 27, 1941 to arrange an interview with President Roosevelt for the next day so that in accordance with his instructions the Japanese Ambassador might present it in person. Meanwhile, both representatives further discussed the relationship between the United States and Japan, with Ambassador Nomura expressing confidence that the new Japanese note offered opportunities for a definite improvement of the situation.
When the Japanese Ambassador mentioned the matter of the two American oil tankers en route to Vladivostok, Secretary Hull immediately forestalled further protests by stating emphatically that the shipments were supported by the Japanese-Russian agreement of Portsmouth, and were as legitimate under all laws of commerce as were the much larger oil exports from this country to Japan. Admitting the strength of Secretary Hull’s argument, Ambassador Nomura nevertheless insisted that agitators constantly reminded the Japanese masses that, while they were forced to use coal, American oil shipments were passing Japan en route to Russia. Secretary Hull then declared that this claim was spurious.
As a remedy, Ambassador Nomura suggested that the two Japanese tankers leaving the United States monthly be loaded with oil for his country. In reply, Secretary Hull requested that Ambassador Nomura inquire about the possibility of Japan’s using its free money as payment, both in the United States and in South America. The Japanese Ambassador readily agreed to look into this matter.[108]
[103] III, 74.
[104] III, 75.
[105] III, 76. Counselor Dooman of the American Embassy in Japan was warned on August 27, 1941 by a Japanese authority that if there were any premature disclosures of the plans for a meeting of Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt at this time when American tankers were enroute to Vladivostok, attempts might be made on the lives of leading members of the Japanese government, S.D., II, 568-569.
[106] “Memorandum by the Secretary”, August 27, 1941, S.D., II, 569-570.
[107] III, 67-75.
[108] “Memorandum by the Secretary”, August 27, 1941, S.D., II, 569-570.
[24]
THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
After giving Secretary Hull a copy of the statement which he was later to present to President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura expressed optimism in regard to the reaching of a satisfactory agreement between the two countries should the United States agree to concessions now being asked by the Japanese government.[109]
(b) Ambassador Nomura’s Report[110]
Ambassador Nomura reported that he had delivered Prince Konoye’s message to Secretary Hull on Wednesday, August 27, 1941. After citing several points orally because the English text had not been completed, Ambassador Nomura requested that he be allowed to see President Roosevelt immediately. Secretary Hull replied that it was impossible on that day, but arrangements would be made for the next morning.
As the conversation progressed, Ambassador Nomura commented on Winston Churchill’s recent speech which the Japanese Ambassador considered harmful to the international situation. Remarking that he had refrained from making any comments on the speech to inquiring members of the press, the Secretary of State mentioned the extremist views that were being expressed at present by various Japanese publications.[111]
In accordance with the directions of his government Ambassador Nomura also spoke of the unfavorable effect that United States’ petroleum shipments to Russia had had upon the Japanese public.[112] Secretary Hull brought out graphs to show the enormous amount of oil that had been furnished to Japan, and compared it with the comparatively small percentage shipped to Russia. Nevertheless, Ambassador Nomura pointed out that the shipment of this oil to Russia by way of Japanese waters had directly followed the embargo of all American exports to Japan and as a result Japanese public opinion had been disturbed.
Since the freezing of Japanese funds throughout the United States would impede the use of export permits even if they were granted by the United States, Secretary Hull suggested that the Japanese government pay for the desired oil from money invested in South America. Believing that there was no other solution but to use this South American money, the Japanese Ambassador requested that Tokyo discuss the matter thoroughly and advise him of any action to be taken.[113]
Two days later on August 29, 1941 Ambassador Nomura again urged that Tokyo immediately purchase the petroleum needed by Japan with funds which were outside of the area affected by the freezing order.[114] According to Ambassador Nomura, Secretary Hull was cognizant of the delicate nature of Japanese-American relations, and was aware that a single disturbing incident could be disastrous. Yet Secretary Hull felt that Japan was making a great problem over the shipment of a few hundred thousand barrels of oil to Russia when, even in the face of popular disapproval, the American government had already exported several million barrels of oil to Japan.
[109] “Memorandum of a conversation”, August 27, 1941, S.D., II, 571.
[110] III, 77.
[111] Ibid. Prime Minister Winston Churchill warns Japan in a world-wide broadcast from London on August 24, 1941 that its aggression in the Far East “has got to stop. Every effort will be made to secure a peaceful settlement. But . . . if these hopes should fail, we shall, of course, range ourselves unhesitatingly at the side of the United States.”—Facts on File Yearbook, 1941, Vol. I, 340.
[112] III, 78
[113] III, 79.
[114] III, 80.
[25]
Referring to the freedom of seas, the Secretary of State explained that he had no desire to permit a third country to interfere with Japanese-American trade. However, Ambassador Nomura explained that the shipment of oil, now unavailable to Japan, through Japanese territorial waters to Vladivostok presented a major problem from the standpoint of Japanese national feeling. Apparently Secretary Hull saw the logic of this remark, for a few days later American newspapers mentioned the possible routing of oil through the Persian Gulf.[115]
29. Mr. Terasaki Requests Ambassador Grew to Recall American Oil Shipments
Meanwhile, the problems evolving from the United States’ shipping oil to Vladivostok were similarly discussed in Japan.[116] After emphasizing the grave internal situation then existing in Japan, on August 27, 1941, Mr. Terasaki, Director of the American Bureau for Japanese Foreign Affairs, delivered to Counselor Dooman an oral statement for Ambassador Grew, which asked that the American tankers now en route to Russia be recalled. If this were impossible, Mr. Terasaki suggested that the ships be rerouted to avoid their passing through the Straits of Saya and Tsugaru, for, in spite of Japan’s non-aggression pact with Russia, the Japanese strongly resented the sending of supplies which might possibly be used against them by Russia.[117]
30. Roosevelt-Nomura Conference (August 28, 1941)
(a) Secretary Hull’s Report Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
On August 28, 1941 Ambassador Nomura called on President Roosevelt to deliver a personal message from the Prime Minister of Japan,[119] and also to submit a reply from the Japanese government regarding President Roosevelt’s communication of August 17, 1941.[120] President Roosevelt read Prince Konoye’s message with interest and complimented its tone. In speaking of the proposed conference mentioned in Prince Konoye’s message, President Roosevelt suggested that, because of the time element involved, Juneau, Alaska might be a better meeting place than Hawaii. The Japanese Ambassador was interested principally in having the conversation held as early as possible.
Turning next to the reply from the Japanese government, which Ambassador Nomura also submitted at this time, the President noted briefly that it did not provide for the discontinuation of Japanese army and naval reinforcements in the Indo-Chinese area while peace conversations were in progress. In addition, Mr. Roosevelt, criticizing Japan’s baseless fear of attack by Russia and its unjustified complaints about oil shipments, reminded Ambassador Nomura that Japan was now in a position to load a number of oilers to transport fuel to its home ports whenever it desired.
After concluding his reading of the Japanese note, President Roosevelt advised Ambassador Nomura that he considered it to be a step forward and, thus, was very hopeful. He mentioned again his interest in spending three or four days with Prince Konoye, possibly at Juneau.[121]
[115] Ibid.
[116] “Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)”, August 27, 1941, S.D., II, 568-569.
[117] Ibid.
[118] “Memorandum by the Secretary of State”, August 28, 1941, S.D., II, 571-572.
[119] S.D., II, 572-573. For translation by American cryptanalysts of text sent from Tokyo to Washington on August 26, 1941 see III, 67-68. For English text of this document sent to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura in code on September 3, 1941 see III, 81-83.
[120] S.D., II, 573-575. For translation by American cryptanalysts of text sent from Tokyo to Washington on August 26, 1941 see III, 69-75. For English text sent to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura on September 3, 1941 see III, 84-88.
[121] “Memorandum by the Secretary of State”, August 28, 1941, S.D., II, 571-572.
[26]
THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
(b) Ambassador Nomura’s Report[122]
In accordance with instructions from Tokyo, on August 28, 1941 at 11:00 A.M. Ambassador Nomura met with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull to present the English text of the Japanese reply to the President’s message of August 17, 1941.[123]
While reading the messages President Roosevelt commended their contents in flattering terms, but in discussing the points pertaining to discrimination, President Roosevelt “cynically” inquired whether an invasion of Thailand would take place during his conference with Prince Konoye just as the invasion of French Indo-China had occurred during Secretary Hull’s conversations with Ambassador Nomura. Nevertheless, President Roosevelt assured Ambassador Nomura that he was looking forward to approximately three days of conversation with Prince Konoye.
The main problem stemmed from the choice of a meeting place. Because the American President, unlike the Japanese Prime Minister who could appoint an acting minister to handle such matters, could not designate the Vice President to sign bills from Congress during his absence,[124] a three weeks round trip to Hawaii would take too much time, whereas a trip to Juneau would consume only 14 days.
Ambassador Nomura declared that as far as Japan was concerned the question of a meeting place was secondary, but it was desired to have the conference take place at the earliest possible date. Though he did not object to this request, President Roosevelt did not suggest a definite time.
President Roosevelt added that the recent meeting with Prime Minister Churchill had been postponed on account of the Balkan War, and that the meeting was then held after Congress had approved it.[125]
31. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 28, 1941)
(a) State Department’s Report[126]
Calling at Secretary Hull’s apartment after his interview with President Roosevelt earlier in the same day, August 28, 1941, Ambassador Nomura stated that he was much encouraged regarding the attempts to improve relations between the two countries. Since Japan was desirous only that the conference be held at an early date, preferably between September 21 and September 25, 1941, to offset Japanese press attacks against the United States, President Roosevelt’s suggestion that the conference be held at Juneau, Alaska would probably be approved by Prime Minister Konoye. Ambassador Nomura pointed out that Prince Konoye would probably be accompanied by a staff of twenty representatives from the Foreign Office, the Army, the Navy, and the Japanese Embassy in Washington. This would be very advantageous in that the Japanese Army and Navy representatives would be equally responsible for any settlement reached. An agreement on publicity concerning the conference would have to be reached by the two governments, especially since the Prime Minister would have to leave Tokyo five days before President Roosevelt left Washington.[127]
[122] III, 89.
[123] Ibid.
[124] Ibid.
[125] III, 90.
[126] “Memorandum of a conversation”, initialed by Joseph W. Ballantine, August 28, 1941, S.D., II, 576-579.
[127] Ibid.
[27]
After promising to refer these points to President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull mentioned the questions that would inevitably arise at such a conference. In his opinion the actual conference should serve only to ratify matters of importance already agreed to in principle. Reference was made to certain difficulties encountered in the previous informal conversations which had caused delays and had finally resulted in Japan’s acting at variance with the spirit of the conversations. In addition, it would be unwise to have a split in the Japanese Diet over the question of peace.
Recognizing the merits of Secretary Hull’s remarks, Ambassador Nomura then summed up the three major difficulties encountered in their conversations: Japan’s relations with the Axis; the retention of Japanese troops in North China and Inner Mongolia; and the application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. Only in regard to the stationing of Japanese forces in North China did the Japanese Ambassador anticipate any trouble. Concerning Japan’s relations with the Axis, Ambassador Nomura was confident that as long as America’s attitude of self-protection remained reasonable and it did not demand a nullification of the Tripartite Pact by requesting a blanket guarantee from Japan for any action it took against Germany in the name of self-defense, no breach would occur between the two countries.
Secretary Hull commented that Mr. Matsuoka’s constant stressing of Japan’s alignment with the Axis and the inopportune time chosen for the signing of the Tripartite Pact had already produced an unfavorable effect on America. Unless something were done to counteract the unfavorable impression, it would prove a source of embarrassment to President Roosevelt upon his return from the proposed meeting with Prince Konoye, for as an indication of its current relations with Germany, the United States was already maintaining patrols all the way to Iceland.[128]
At this point, Ambassador Nomura discussed the United States’ position in aiding in the settlement of the Chinese situation and commented that Japan preferred to have the United States use its influence to bring Japan and China together to settle their own difficulties rather than have the United States discuss the basic peace terms with Japan. Secretary Hull made it clear, however, that before exercising its good offices between China and Japan, the United States would first consider the basic terms on which Japan proposed to negotiate, since it was necessary to have the friendship and confidence of the Chinese government before and after the negotiations. Both America and Japan, he felt, should consider the potentialities of China as a trading nation.
Ambassador Nomura agreed that the Chinese question was important, but remarked that there were other questions which could be settled at the conference in order to tide over a critical situation. Since the China Incident was one of the major questions calling for settlement, Secretary Hull believed that unless a conciliation were reached in this regard, it would remain the root of future instability. Ambassador Nomura recognized the soundness of this statement, particularly in view of the French Indo-China situation. Mr. Ballantine pointed out that Japan had promised to remove its troops from that area as soon as the China affair was settled.
After recapitulating briefly Secretary Hull’s statements to make sure that he understood them, Ambassador Nomura left after commenting that he did not know how far the Japanese government could go in view of internal political difficulties, but Prince Konoye as a man of great courage was willing to assume great risks to improve relations.[129]
[128] Ibid.
[129] Ibid.
[28]
THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
(b) Ambassador Nomura’s Report[130]
Ambassador Nomura reported that on the evening of August 28, 1941 he had exchanged opinions with Secretary Hull on the problems of the proposed conference. If either of the conferring leaders assumed an uncompromising attitude on certain points, the result would greatly endanger Japanese-American relations. For that reason, Secretary Hull desired that preliminary conversations be held for the purpose of effecting a general agreement prior to the major meeting.
While it was necessary to bring up-to-date both the Japanese and American policies, Secretary Hull maintained that the Chinese question would not necessarily stand in the way of an amicable understanding. On the other hand, the United States refused to adjust its relations with Japan at the expense of its friendship with China. Furthermore, even if America accepted a basis for a Japanese-Chinese peace, it would be faced with the tremendous problem of winning the approval of both Great Britain and Soviet Russia.
Ambassador Nomura refrained from clarifying further his government’s statements regarding the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and the right of protection, but he was convinced that as long as Prince Konoye retained his position as Japanese Foreign Minister, every effort would be made to settle Far Eastern problems satisfactorily. Secretary Hull expressed the hope that Japan would take definite steps towards this end.
Ambassador Nomura reminded his government of the wide difference in viewpoint between the two governments which he had noticed during discussions on the proposals for an Understanding Pact. He feared that Tokyo’s proposals would only add to the existing misunderstanding. In order that Japan might obtain further details regarding America’s viewpoint, Ambassador Nomura asked that Colonel Iwakuro be consulted upon his return to Tokyo.
Ambassador Nomura then offered his government certain suggestions, in the event that Tokyo had agreed upon a meeting between the leaders of the two governments. Ambassador Nomura advised that his government consent to Juneau, Alaska as the conference site, if Constitutional requirements and reasons for personal safety made Hawaii unsatisfactory for President Roosevelt. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.INFO
The conference date would be set about September 21, 1941 with five persons each from the Foreign Office; the Ministries of Navy and War, the Embassy and the Consulate in attendance.[131] Since it was assumed that Prince Konoye would make the trip by warship, about ten days would be required. Ambassador Nomura believed that the best time to make a public statement regarding the meeting would be shortly after the Prime Minister’s departure from Tokyo.
Although Secretary Hull had agreed to discuss these points with President Roosevelt, he was extremely cautious in commenting on the proposed conference. Ambassador Nomura pointed out that Secretary Hull was an exceedingly cautious person, and warned that unless the two governments arrived at a fairly close agreement regarding the terms surrounding this meeting, the conference would never materialize.[132]
32. Secret Interpretation of Japan’s Reply to President Roosevelt
On August 28, 1941 the Japanese government advised Ambassador Nomura concerning the interpretation of its recent reply to President Roosevelt.[133] After stressing certain instructions
[130] III, 91.
[131] Ibid.
[132] III, 92.
[133] III, 93.
[29]
regarding the style and form to be used in future messages pertaining to the question of Japanese-American relations, the Foreign Office advised Ambassador Nomura that the phrase “should a just peace be established in the Far East” meant that when the Chiang regime had become merely a local regime as a result of the closing of the routes to Chungking, when Japanese-Chinese relations had returned, on the whole, to normality, and when Japan efficiently and justly could secure the materials it needed from French Indo-China, Japan would consider withdrawing its troops from French Indo-China even before the complete settlement of the China Incident. The statement had been made originally because Japan had desired to allow as much flexibility as possible in the coming conversations.
With regard to the phrase “which will be applicable to the whole world, etc.,” Japan wished to ensure that restrictions enforced against Japan within the East Asia area, where it hoped to establish the New Order Sphere of Co-prosperity, would be incumbent upon the United States outside the Pacific area.[134]
The Japanese government also pointed out to Ambassador Nomura that there were logical reasons for Japan’s agreeing that all countries enjoying favorable conditions or having advantages over other countries should assume an attitude of strict impartiality in regard to the distribution of necessary materials. Japan felt that it would naturally assume this economic leadership within the East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity.
Since Japan’s proposal had stated that it was natural and essential to make all adjustments in a spirit of equality and reciprocity with adjacent areas, Japan’s position toward Manchukuo and China was thereby clarified, for such good neighborliness would ensure the establishment of the East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity. This policy was not, as the United States alleged it to be, aimed at securing a position superior to other nations in that area, since Japan was following closely the policy set forth in the American Monroe Doctrine. Furthermore, in order to satisfy “the requirements essential to the existence of a country” Japan would naturally take part in a joint defense of China.
Tokyo informed Ambassador Nomura that it had inserted these passages in its reply to President Roosevelt to guard against the possibility of its being too narrowly restricted in any discussions concerning the method by which the East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity was to be established.[135]
33. American Newspaperman Seeks Details of Prince Konoye’s Message
In spite of the efforts of both Japanese and American officials to safeguard the secrecy of their conversations, certain publicity leaks occurred. On August 28, 1941, a reporter of the New York Herald Tribune called on Mr. Terasaki to inquire about the contents of the message from Prime Minister Konoye to President Roosevelt. Although Mr. Terasaki refused to refer to the contents of that message, it was alleged that in a recent interview with President Roosevelt it had been learned that Prime Minister Konoye wished to hold a conference with the American President in Hawaii.[136]
34. The Press Is Informed of Prince Konoye’s Message To President Roosevelt
Ambassador Nomura advised Tokyo on August 28, 1941 that since the White House had announced the time for the interview with Ambassador Nomura, Secretary Hull had made public
[134] III, 94.
[135] III, 95.
[136] III, 96.
[30]
THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
the fact that a message from Prince Konoye had been delivered to President Roosevelt by Ambassador Nomura.[137] However, it was agreed by both the Japanese and American representatives that no reference would be made to the contents of this message.[138]
The Japanese press was notified on August 29, 1941 that Premier Konoye had sent a message to President Roosevelt but no details were given.[139]
35. Tokyo Demands Secrecy Concerning Proposed Conference
Since a disclosure in Japan of any information connected with the proposed conference between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye would endanger the successful conclusion of such a meeting, on August 29, 1941 Tokyo reiterated its warnings concerning the necessity of secrecy.[140] Ambassador Nomura was informed that on August 28, 1941 the Domei News Service had reported the reference to Prince Konoye’s message which he had made in a press conference. Although Tokyo had been able to suppress these dispatches, a fairly large group of people had learned of their contents. In order to prevent similar occurrences in the future, the Japanese Foreign Office requested that Ambassador Nomura refrain from making any mention of Prince Konoye’s message until he had first communicated with Tokyo.[141]
Tokyo pointed out that it had intended to keep the matter a strict secret for the time being, but since the news dispatch had been released in Washington, there was danger of further misunderstanding if it attempted to continue suppressing and censoring the news in Japan. Therefore, at 2:30 P.M. on August 29, 1941 certain sections of Prince Konoye’s message were announced to the Japanese public.[142] Since the question of time was of the utmost importance, Tokyo requested that Ambassador Nomura explain to American authorities that it had not been able to wait to contact them.
Major reasons for the security measures taken by Japan were in relations with Germany and Italy, and its exceedingly complex domestic situation. Japan felt it quite possible that the United States had deliberately publicized this document in order to estrange Japan from the Axis countries. If information were allowed to leak out before a settlement was reached, there was actual danger that the project would fail. Though Ambassador Nomura’s actions might be curtailed somewhat as a result, Japan insisted that he consult with the Foreign Office before making any public statements.
In regard to a suitable location for the “leaders’ conference”, Japan advised Ambassador Nomura that in case Hawaii were not selected, a place which was part of either nation should not be chosen, for President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye could meet at some spot on the high seas.[143]
In reply, Ambassador Nomura explained to Tokyo the difficulty of seeing President Roosevelt secretly since the American press was furnished with the list of callers at the White House. However, the Japanese Ambassador promised to consult with Secretary Hull to determine measures of avoiding undesirable publicity in the future.[144]
[137] The New York Times, August 29, 1941, 1:5 reported that Ambassador Nomura, at Prince Konoye’s request, had begun conferences with President Roosevelt and in Secretary Hull’s presence had delivered a note from the Japanese Prime Minister.
[138] III, 97.
[139] “The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State”, S.D., II, 579.
[140] III, 98.
[141] Ibid.
[142] III, 99. See Section 39 for Ambassador Grew’s report to the State Department which indicates that no details of Prince Konoye’s message were released to the Japanese press. See III, 103.
[143] Ibid.
[144] III, 100. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
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